This is the second in a new series on The Athletic looking back at the winners of each World Cup, from Uruguay in 1930 through to Argentina in 2022. This edition focuses on World Cup 1934.
Introduction
Italy had wanted to host World Cup 1930, and refused to participate when it was instead awarded to Uruguay. So when Italy were granted the right to host World Cup 1934, Uruguay pulled the same trick and didn’t travel to Europe.
Leaving aside the politics of it all, in a way you can’t blame them. This 16-team tournament was contested as a straight knockout competition, meaning Brazil and Argentina made extraordinarily long journeys by sea, only to play a single game in Italy.
Uruguay’s victory four years earlier was heavily dependent upon home advantage, but Italy took that home advantage to a completely different level. They replicated Uruguay’s intense training camp in the period leading up to the tournament, but more significantly, this World Cup was blatantly used by fascist dictator Benito Mussolini as propaganda tool, and coach Vittorio Pozzo later claimed that ‘Il Duce’ had personally asked him to select only Fascist Party members for Italy’s squad, although the players claimed they were only really interested in football and had little choice but to ‘support’ the nationalistic cause.
The Italian team performing a fascist salute at the 1934 World Cup (Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
Mussolini had realised, perhaps before any other political leader, the power football had over people. In the mid-late 1920’s his regime reorganised the Italian FA to give him direct control over key appointments, and it could be argued he effectively invented Serie A in 1929, as previously there had been northern and southern Italian championships. He desperately wanted Italy to host a World Cup. And he desperately wanted Italy to win it too.
The tournament was played out in an atmosphere which foreigners found deeply uncomfortable; Italy had a win-at-all-costs mentality which went beyond anything that could be considered acceptable now or then, including brutal levels of physicality and suspicious refereeing performances. The final, meanwhile, “was equated in the press to a Fascist rally rather than a World Cup final”, wrote Italy historian Simon Martin.
Amongst all this, it should be noted that the tournament was, in other ways, a success. Sixteen was a ‘proper’ number of teams, more of the game’s genuine powers had entered than in 1930, there was a decent amount of travelling support (granted, thanks to the Italian government subsiding it, to make the tournament look universally popular) and it was financially profitable for Italy.
The manager
If Alberto Suppici, Uruguay’s World Cup-winning coach in 1930, was something of a background figure, over whom there was a debate about precisely whether or not his role really constituted that of a ‘manager’, Pozzo was the complete opposite. An authoritarian manager who was in his fourth stint as national team boss — very Italian — he was a keen tactician.
Pozzo credited part of his management ability to his time studying in the north of England at the turn of the century, where he became fascinated by Manchester United. His playing career was relatively minor, and he juggled coaching Torino with working for Italian tyre manufacturers Pirelli. At some point it seemed Pozzo had retired from coaching, but the death of his wife prompted a change of heart.
Pozzo was popular amongst journalists because he was one himself — before, after and indeed during after his spell as national side coach. But his track record can’t be faulted. He’s the only manager to win two World Cups, and the only manager to triumph in the World Cup and the Olympics.
Pozzo is carried by his victorious players after the final in Rome (Keystone/Getty Images)
Tactics
Pozzo was partly credited with the invention of the ‘metodo’ formation, which involved modifying the classic 2-3-5 into more defensive system, with the wider players in the midfield becoming something approaching the full-backs we’re accustomed to in the modern era, and the inside-forwards in the front five dropping back into midfield. At the time it would be recognised as a relation to the 2-3-5, but in 2025 bears resemblance to a 4-3-3.
A crucial detail was the role of the centre-half — as it was then, the middle of the midfield trio — which had previously been considered an attacking role. Now, due to changes in the offside law, teams became more cautious and Pozzo was one of the coaches who recognised that the centre-half should now drop deeper and sometimes even mark the opposition centre-forward. Luis Monti did that excellently, being particularly commended for nullifying Austrian Matthias Sindelar, perhaps the tournament’s outstanding individual, in the semi-final.
While they hit seven goals in their thrashing of a poor USA side in the first round (or, if you like, the round of 16) Italy only scored five goals in their subsequent 420 minutes in the tournament, a somewhat low tally at a time when football matches regularly featured plenty of goals.
It was a side largely based around being solid, cautious and physical — and reliant on the odd moment of individual magic up front — rather than a team that determinedly outplayed opponents. It set the tone for future Italian teams.
You might be surprised to learn…
Centre-half Monti had also played in the World Cup 1930 final for Argentina. On the back of his performance in Uruguay, and because he held Italian citizenship, he was signed by Juventus and therefore Pozzo became interested in using him for the national side, at a time before FIFA clamped down on players switching their international allegiance, meaning he remains the only player to play in two World Cup finals for two different sides.
Two others who started for Italy in the final weren’t really Italian either — they were Argentine, although both had Italian ancestry. Left-winger Raimundo Orsi was capped 12 times for his native country, before switching allegiance after signing for Juventus, and right-winger Enrique Guaita played four times for Argentina before choosing to represent Italy after signing for Roma.
Enrique Guaita and Raimundo Orsi are sixth and seventh from the left respectively (AFP via Getty Images)
It’s significant that Italy looked to foreigners for width, as they’ve generally struggled to produce top-class wingers themselves over the years. Their most recent World Cup success, in 2006, came with Argentine-born Mauro Camoranesi, who qualified for citizenship through his Italian great-grandfather (who had moved to Argentina in 1873, long before even players who played in this 1934 final had been born.)
“If they can die for Italy, they can play for Italy,” declared Pozzo when asked about nationalising foreign players, in reference to their eligibility for the armed forces, although the relevant players would later show rather less interest in that.
Argentina were so scared of others being poached by Italian clubs that they sent a reserve squad to World Cup 1934. None of the players that reached the final four years earlier were present here — with the exception, of course, of Monti.
Key Player
The stadium generally known as ‘San Siro’ in Milan is actually called the Stadio Giuseppe Meazza, named after the Inter (and briefly, Milan) forward who was Italy’s main attraction at this tournament. Originally a defender, he was converted into a striker and then into an inside-forward, and while his goalscoring record is one of the best in Italian history, he was as much a dribbler and a creator as a goalscorer.
Meazza was one of five players to play in all five games, scoring the seventh in the routine 7-1 thrashing of the USA, and also netting the winner in the quarter-final replay against Spain.
Meazza was a naturally talented genius who wasn’t particularly interested in training or defending, and was rather more fond of cigarettes. Italy’s first genuine superstar, he was renowned for his immaculate hair. He featured heavily in adverts at the time, and briefly became a film star in his retirement, before becoming a manager.
Giuseppe Meazza and his immaculate hair (AFP via Getty Images)
“Having him on the team was like starting 1-0 up,” said Pozzo. Meazza played a crucial role in Italy’s winning goal in the final despite being injured, because Czechoslovakia considered that he was struggling so badly he wasn’t worth marking. Meazza was therefore free to receive the ball, and played a crucial pass in the build-up.
The final
The 2-1 final win over Czechoslovakia is remembered as much for the jubilant crowd scenes as the football on the pitch, which represented something of a success for the regime. The truth is that the Stadio Olimpico featured thousands of empty seats, at a time when the popularity of football in the north hadn’t quite spread to the capital.
Czechoslovakia played the better football and took the lead with 19 minutes remaining when Antonin Puc fired home from a tight angle after his own corner had been cleared back to him. They could have wrapped up the game before Italy launched their comeback, with striker Jiri Sobotka missing a good chance and Frantisek Svoboda hitting the post.
Then came the Italian wave of pressure, with Orsi equalising nine minutes from time — more on that shortly — and then came the winning goal in extra time, scored by Bologna centre-forward Angelo Schiavio. He received a pass from Guaita and finished, despite hobbling with injury throughout extra time — he was so exhausted that he collapsed on the floor later on. Interestingly, one of Pozzo’s key tactics throughout the tournament was getting Schiavio and Guaita, centre-forward and winger, to constantly switch positions. It seemed to pay off as they combined for the winner.
Italy didn’t merely lift the World Cup trophy. This was Mussolini’s tournament, so they were also handed the Coppa Del Duce, and a signed photograph of the man himself.
Some of the empty seats at the final in Rome can be seen behind the Italy team (AFP via Getty Images)
The defining moment
Italy’s equaliser in the final, rather than the winner, went down in history. Winger Orsi dribbled inside, faked to shoot with his left foot before then surprisingly shooting with the outside of his right, which fooled everyone, including Czech ‘keeper Frantisek Planicka (who, like his opposite number Gianpiero Combi, was his side’s captain) and curled into the net.
This was widely considered a fluke by the journalists covering the final. A furious Orsi bet them he could recreate the goal if he tried — so the next day, in front of assembled photographers, he had 20 attempts at replicating his strike, and missed every time. The journalists doubled down: it was a fluke.
Were they definitely the best team?
Leaving aside the issue that the world champions Uruguay were absent, as were England (possibly the best side in the world, who would defeat Italy six months later in the infamous Battle of Highbury) it’s difficult to be at all confident that Italy were the best side at this competition.
The peculiarities started before the competition. In a two-legged qualifier against Greece, Italy won the first leg 4-0. Ahead of the return leg in Athens, Greece suddenly withdrew. Perhaps they simply accepted their inferiority; but later reports suggested that Italy had effectively paid them to withdraw by paying for the Greek FA’s new headquarters. In 1995, Italian newspaper La Repubblica published an allegation that various key figures in Greek football had been paid off too.
Italy would surely have qualified anyway. Still, when it came to the tournament itself, the matches were probably fixed. There were various reports that Mussolini had personally chosen the referees for Italy’s matches. Conveniently enough, Italy were the beneficiaries of some remarkable decisions throughout the tournament.
In the quarter-final against Spain, Italy used a remarkably physical approach to injure opposition players — particularly Ricardo Zamora, then considered the world’s best goalkeeper. Italy’s goal in a 1-1 draw probably involved a foul on him by striker Schiavio, even by the rough standards of the time — the referee initially disallowed the goal before the Italian players convinced him to change his mind. Later, Spain had a goal disallowed for offside.
In a replay the following day, Spain had been so badly battered that they had to make seven changes — including leaving out Zamora — and lost 1-0 to the hosts in a game that involved two Spanish goals being disallowed for offside, one of which was seemingly a catastrophically wrong decision. French newspaper L’Auto — predecessor of L’Equipe — wrote that the Swiss referee ‘constantly appeared to be Italy’s 12th man’, and afterwards he was permanently suspended by both FIFA and the Swiss FA.
Their 1-0 semi-final victory over Austria was less about refereeing controversy (although an Austrian later claimed the referee headed a loose ball back to an Italian) and more about an awful pitch preventing their opponents, renowned for their passing game, from playing their best football. Italy were also lucky that inside-right Karl Zischek missed a massive chance late on.
Giuseppe Meazza sets up Italy’s goal in the semi-final against Austria (Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)
“The tournament left a bitter taste outside Italy,” wrote Ian Morrison in his history of the World Cup. “There was little doubt that Italy had won because they were the host nation, and local fanaticism had intimidated referees.”
We can be sure that Pozzo was a legendary coach, and Meazza was a world-class striker. But Italy’s success, in itself, was dubious at best. Still, they would have a chance to prove their dominance four years later, in France.
(Top photo: Getty Images; design: Demetrius Robinson)
